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1Since November, events in Turkey have taken a severe 
turn for the worse. The police raids that revealed a 
corruption scandal on December 17, and the allega-
tions of massive bidrigging and money laundering by 
people at the highest levels of the government, have 
sparked a frantic crackdown by the ruling Justice and 
Development (AK) Party. More journalists have been 
fired for speaking out. Thousands of police officers 
and prosecutors have been fired or relocated across 
the country. Amendments to the Internet regulation 
law proposed by the government would make it 
possible for officials to block websites without  
court orders. The government is also threatening the 
separation of powers by putting the judiciary, includ-
ing criminal investigations, under direct control of the 
Ministry of Justice. The crisis of democracy in Turkey 
is not a future problem—it is right here, right now.
This report on the media recognizes that what is 
happening in Turkey is bigger than one institution and 
part of a long history that continues to shape current 
events. The media in Turkey have always been close  
to the state; as recently as 1997, large media organiza-
tions were co-opted by the military to subvert a 
democratically elected government. The AK Party was 
formed in the wake of those events. But even as it has 
tamed the military, the AKP has been unable to resist 
the temptations of authoritarianism embedded in the 
state. Over the past seven years, the government has 
increasingly employed a variety of strong-arm tactics 
to suppress the media’s proper role as a check on 
power. Some of the most disturbing efforts include 
the following:
•  Intimidation: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
frequently attacks journalists by name after they  
write critical commentary. In several well-known  
cases, like those of Hasan Cemal and Nuray Mert, 
journalists have lost their jobs after these public 
attacks. Sympathetic courts hand out convictions 
in defamation cases for criticism.
•   Mass firings: At least 59 journalists were fired  
or forced out in retaliation for their coverage of  
Executive Summary
In November 2013, a Freedom House delegation traveled to Turkey to meet with  
journalists, NGOs, business leaders, and senior government officials about the  
deteriorating state of media freedom in the country. The delegation’s objective 
was to investigate reports of government efforts to pressure and intimidate jour-
nalists and of overly close relationships between media owners and government, 
which, along with bad laws and overly aggressive prosecutors, have muzzled 
objective reporting in Turkey.
Freedom House
www.freedomhouse.org
2Freedom House calls on the government of Turkey  
to recognize that in a democracy, a free press and 
other independent institutions play a very important 
role. There are clear and concrete steps the Turkish 
government must take to end the intimidation and 
corruption of Turkey’s media. Chief among these are 
the following: 
• Cease threats against journalists.
•   Repeal the criminal defamation law and overly 
broad antiterrorism and “criminal organization” laws 
that have been used to jail dozens of journalists.
•   Comply with European and international standards 
in procurement practices in order to reduce  
the incentive for media owners to curry favor  
by distorting the news. Turkish media owners  
themselves must make a commitment to support 
changes in procurement practices if they are to  
win back the trust of Turkey’s citizens. 
Although building a resilient democracy is fundamen-
tally up to Turkish citizens, the international commu-
nity cannot afford to be bystanders. The European 
Union and the OSCE have raised strong concerns 
about government pressure on Turkey’s media, and 
the EU’s warnings against governmental overreach 
have been pointed. Unfortunately, the same cannot be 
said for the United States. The Obama administration 
has been far too slow to realize the seriousness of the 
threat to Turkey’s democracy. U.S. criticism of the 
Turkish government’s recent actions has come from 
the State Department spokesperson and White House 
press secretary, not from the high-ranking officials 
who need to be engaged in responding to a crisis of 
this scale. Where European governments and institu-
tions have been specifically and publicly engaged with 
the government over the crisis, the Obama adminis-
tration has avoided the difficult issues. It is time to 
speak frankly and with seriousness about the growing 
threat to democracy in Turkey, and to place freedom 
of expression and democracy at the center of the 
policy relationship.
last summer’s Gezi Park protests. The December 
corruption scandal has produced another string  
of firings of prominent columnists.
•   Buying off or forcing out media moguls:  
Holding companies sympathetic to the government 
receive billions of dollars in government contracts, 
often through government bodies housed in the 
prime minister’s office. Companies with media 
outlets critical of the government have been 
targets of tax investigations, forced to pay large 
fines, and likely disadvantaged in public tenders.
•   Wiretapping: The National Security Organization 
has wiretapped journalists covering national 
security stories, using false names on the warrants 
in order to avoid judicial scrutiny.
•   Imprisonment: Dozens of journalists remain 
imprisoned under broadly defined antiterrorism 
laws. A majority of those in prison are Kurds, and 
some analysts believe the government is using 
them as bargaining chips in negotiations with  
the Kurdish PKK. 
These tactics are unacceptable in a democracy. They 
deny Turkish citizens full access to information and 
constrain a healthy political debate. Journalists and 
government officials alike acknowledge that reporters 
and news organizations have practiced self-censor-
ship to avoid angering the government, and especially 
Prime Minister Erdoğan. 
The intentional weakening of Turkey’s democratic 
institutions, including attempts to bully and censor 
Turkey’s media, should and must be a matter of deep 
concern for the United States and the European 
Union. As the AK Party’s internal coalition has grown 
more fragile, Erdoğan has used his leverage over the 
media to push issues of public morality and religion 
and to squelch public debate of the accountability of 
his government. The result is an increasingly polarized 
political arena and society.
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3Turkey’s democracy is in crisis. Three and a half million 
people across the country took part in the Gezi Park 
protests last summer. Yet the AKP-led government’s 
response, first to the protests and now to the  
December 17 corruption scandal, has been to crack 
down even harder on its critics, fanning even wider 
public alienation. At least 59 journalists were fired 
during the Gezi protests for criticism of the govern-
ment, and more have lost their jobs in recent weeks 
for criticizing the government over corruption. As  
this report is being written, Prime Minister Erdoğan  
is advocating the reversal of important democratic 
reforms his own party championed just a few years ago. 
This report focuses on one element of the crisis in 
Turkey’s democracy: the government’s increasing 
pressure on the media over the last seven years.  
While acknowledging that Turkey’s current crisis is 
bigger and more systemic, Freedom House believes  
it is important to analyze in depth the government’s 
efforts to marginalize and suppress independent 
voices and reporting in Turkey’s media. A free press is 
a vital actor in any democracy, providing accountability 
and encouraging a healthy public debate. In Turkey, 
with a weak opposition and judiciary, an unfettered 
press is essential. The muzzling of the press in the last 
seven years has contributed to the wide disjuncture 
between citizens and their government. It is both a 
symptom and a cause of the current crisis.
The problem of media freedom—and the eager 
collaboration by media owners with the government—
did not start with the AK Party. During nearly five 
decades of military “guardianship” (punctuated by 
coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980), the Turkish military 
and their bureaucratic allies enforced a set of red lines 
restraining discussion of ethnic identity, religion,  
and history outside the narrow bounds of secular 
nationalism. In 1997, leading media outlets supported 
the military’s efforts to undermine the coalition led by  
the Islamist Welfare Party, which eventually led to the 
collapse of the democratically elected government  
in what is often called the “post-modern coup.”
Formed after the banning of the Welfare Party and  
its successor, the Virtue Party, the AK Party was a 
victim of these harsh restrictions on free speech. 
Then-mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
served jail time after he gave an Islamic-nationalist  
speech in 1997, and was still banned from serving in  
office when his AKP won general elections in 2002.  
Although the party arguably won on the public’s 
mistrust of a political establishment that had driven  
it into economic crisis in 2001, the AKP’s commitment 
to inclusive, democratic governance also appealed  
to Turkey’s voters and clearly distinguished it from  
the Welfare Party.
Many in Turkey, including liberals and members of 
minority groups interviewed for this report, agree  
that there was progress under the AK Party in some 
important areas of free expression. Long-standing 
taboos against discussion of minority rights, including 
the rights of Kurds and Alevis, headscarves for women, 
and the Armenian genocide have all been lifted, even 
if laws that could punish such discussion remain on 
the books. Given the severe restrictions under military 
tutelage, these accomplishments are not insignificant.
Yet credit for such gains cannot offset the atmosphere 
of intimidation that deepened as the AKP consolidated 
its power. Kurdish journalists have been arrested 
Introduction
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4along with Kurdish activists and held as bargaining 
chips in peace negotiations with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK). Editors and reporters from 
across Turkey’s media told Freedom House  
about angry phone calls from the prime minister’s 
office after critical stories run, and—long before 
Gezi—of media owners being told to fire specific 
reporters. In a growing number of cases, editors and 
owners are firing reporters preemptively to avoid a 
confrontation with government officials. Reporters 
who still hold their jobs admit to censoring their own 
coverage to ensure they remain employed. When they 
cover politics, media employees are forced to be more 
concerned about their jobs than about the story.
At the heart of the problem are politicians and a  
prime minister who came to power vowing to create  
a more liberal government but have become increas-
ingly intolerant of criticism and dissent. Even as  
late as 2010, the AK Party successfully campaigned  
to pass a referendum allowing the parliament to  
amend aspects of the 1982 constitution, adopted 
while Turkey was under martial law. The referendum 
included numerous changes to increase the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, to improve separation of 
powers, and to protect the rights of individuals. 
Following its victory in 2011, the AKP pledged to  
work with other parties to rewrite the constitution 
altogether, a project that has now collapsed.
Yet despite winning the referendum and holding a 
parliamentary majority, the AKP has not rejected the 
arbitrary powers the state still retains, or built a strong 
system of democratic checks and balances. Among 
the changes proposed by the party after the corrup-
tion scandal broke this December has been a repeal 
of the democratic reforms to the judiciary it fought for 
in 2010. Limited improvements in media laws have 
been trumped by the government’s continued use  
of broad antiterrorism and criminal defamation laws  
that allow the government wide leeway in punishing 
dissent. The government has also not hesitated to use 
an intrusive state security apparatus to illegally spy  
on and harass journalists.
The government’s greatest leverage over the  
media, however, is economic. The prime minister’s 
office controls the allocation of billions of dollars  
in privatized assets, housing contracts, and a public 
procurement process that allows rewarding favored 
companies, including those with media arms. As the  
AK Party has consolidated power, it has used the  
government agency responsible for sales of defaulting 
companies to transfer control of some of the  
country’s most important media outlets to supporters. 
Tax investigations have been used to punish media 
outlets that dare to challenge the government. The 
once-dominant Doğan Media Group was assessed 
enormous fines and forced to sell off several media 
properties, including one of the country’s leading 
papers, Milliyet, after its reporting on AKP corruption  
infuriated the government. 
Now, as the December 17 corruption scandal  
unfolds, the retreat from the early years of the AKP-led 
liberalization is in full force. The government has even 
floated the possibility of mending its bridges with the 
military, claiming that it was the same over-zealous 
prosecutors from the Gülen religious community who 
initiated the coup-conspiracy trials that broke the 
military’s influence. All of this has led to a profound 
crisis of confidence in the Erdoğan government and, 
chillingly, the future of Turkey’s democracy.
There are positive signs that with the government 
suddenly weakened, some of Turkey’s media are 
beginning to remember their long-suppressed role, 
breaking stories and covering the corruption  
scandal in depth. Outlets associated with the  
Gülen movement like Zaman, Today’s Zaman, and  
Bugün; Doğan-owned Radikal and Hürriyet; T24, an  
independent Internet news site;1 and even formerly  
pro-government media like Habertürk are finding  
their voices after years of harassment and pressure. 
There is no way of knowing how long or even whether 
this will last. At the same time, yet more prominent 
columnists are losing their jobs, such as Nazlı Ilıcak 
from Sabah and Murat Aksoy from Yeni Şafak.
As reflected in Freedom House’s annual ratings, 
including Freedom in the World, Turkey is not a 
dictatorship. It is a country where different views are 
expressed and heard, with a vibrant and diverse civil 
society. But it remains a country where criticizing  
the government means risking your livelihood, your 
reputation, and sometimes, your freedom. And at the 
present moment, it is a country where the govern-
ment is behaving more, rather than less, authoritarian. 
The European Union and the United States must be 
fully engaged in the defense of Turkey’s democracy. 
While the EU has spoken out forcefully in recent 
1   Disclosure: The owner of T24 Doğan Akın is a founding member of P24, a non-profit organization that promotes press independence,  
of which report co-author Andrew Finkel is also a founding member. 
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5months as Turkey has moved further away from its 
democratic commitments, the U.S. has refrained from 
high-level criticism or engagement. It is past the time 
for a real change in U.S. policy to one based on 
hardheaded analysis.
There are long-term steps that the U.S. should support 
to encourage reform in Turkey, including negotiating a 
free-trade pact to parallel the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership between the U.S. and EU. 
Such an agreement must require that Turkey commit 
to transparent procurement practices. In addition  
to strong rhetorical defenses of a free Turkish press, 
the United States and Europe should also marshal 
investment and development funds to support the 
growth of independent Turkish media. Most important, 
with Turkey’s government proposing new steps every 
day that would reverse democratic gains, the U.S. 
should elevate Turkey’s democratic crisis to a matter 
of bilateral importance and engagement. The crisis is 
real and Turkey is too important in its own right, and in 
its relations with other countries, for more denial or 
deliberate inattention.
The Media Sector in Turkey
Even with the constraints placed on a free press, 
Turkey has a rapidly growing media and entertainment 
sector—the result of the increasing education and 
wealth of a population with a deep hunger for  
information about their country and the world. In 
2013, PricewaterhouseCoopers projected the sector’s 
value at $11.6 billion, with estimated 11.4 percent 
annual growth between 2013 and 2017, more than 
double the global average.1 Among European coun-
tries, Turkey has a relatively low newspaper circulation 
of 96 newspapers bought daily per 1,000 population.2 
Spurred by the growth in the Turkish economy, 
advertising revenue reached $2.5 billion in 2011, the 
bulk of which accrued to television, which includes 
popular serials, sports, and daytime talk shows, as 
well as news coverage.3 A small number of wealthy 
holding companies own nearly all of the country’s 
most important outlets in both television and print. 
Many companies are dependent on government favor, 
and even those with limited direct dealings with the 
government would find it hard to operate in the face 
of active hostility. 
National newspapers based in Istanbul and Ankara 
account for 80.6 percent of the country’s annual  
circulation,4 and at most a dozen of those dominate 
the national conversation on domestic politics and 
international affairs.5 Most media outlets have 
well-known and clear-cut political allegiances. Sözcü 
(360,000 circulation) is Kemalist, BirGün (11,000) is 
leftist, Yeni Şafak (127,000) is Islamist, Zaman 
(1,161,000) is associated with the Gülen movement, 
and so on.6  The ideological profiles of the papers can 
mask the depth of the harassment and restrictions on 
Turkey’s media. In interviews for this report, high-rank-
ing officials repeatedly pointed to the polemical 
antigovernment tone of Sözcü, for instance, as proof 
of freedom of speech. But despite being among the 
country’s highest-circulating dailies, Sözcü only 
reaches the substantial minority already predisposed 
to its secularist Kemalist views, which would never 
vote for the AK Party. It is not a government target.
There is also a group of newspapers considered  
“mainstream,” meaning that despite their political 
legacies they can reach an audience beyond the  
true believers of one ideological group. These papers 
include Hürriyet (409,000), Milliyet (168,000),  
Sabah (319,000), and Akşam (103,000). A key aspect 
of the government’s efforts to control the media has 
been to focus most of its attention and pressure on 
these “mainstream” outlets. The government-backed 
sales of Sabah and Akşam to pro-government 
business groups and the forced sale of Milliyet to a  
pro-government business group to pay off the Doğan 
Media Group’s tax penalties reduced these papers’  
independence. Milliyet has laid off important critical 
columnists like Hasan Cemal and Can Dündar.  
In the most flagrant cases of Sabah and Akşam,  
the papers have become mouthpieces for the 
government, what some call “Erdoğanist” media. 
Historical Development
The events of the last 12 years, including the AKP-
led government’s intensifying crackdown on media 
freedom, cannot be understood without the context 
of decades of military “guardianship” and the overly 
close relationship between the military and the media.
While ownership has shifted, in many cases the desire 
to curry favor with the government has remained the 
same. Following the coup of 1980 and the develop-
ment of liberal economic policies under then-Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal, family ownership in the media 
market was replaced by corporate holding compa-
nies (albeit still with a strong family component) that 
benefited hugely from their close relationships with 
the government. 
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6In nearly all cases, these holding companies earn  
only a small fraction of their revenue from their media 
outlets, with the bulk of profits coming from other 
interests, such as construction, mining, finance, or 
energy (see Table 1). In Turkey’s still state-centered 
economy, privatization of government assets and 
government contracts are a huge source of the 
holding companies’ income. This has created a 
situation in which media outlets are used to promote 
the ownership group’s financial interests. Members  
of the media and the government alike describe 
newspapers’ Ankara bureau chiefs as “lobbyists” for 
their companies.7
Holding company owners who rely on the state for 
business have shown little commitment to real 
 debate, and even less sense of responsibility for 
providing a check on government power. In 1997, 
when the military forced the collapse of a coalition  
led by the Islamist Welfare Party, large media  
outlets supported the military with sensationalized 
and baseless stories about the Islamist threat  
to democracy.8
The AK Party and the current government were forged 
by that history. Prime Minister Erdoğan and President 
Abdullah Gül were both members of the banned  
Welfare Party. When Erdoğan served four months in 
prison in 1997, and was subsequently barred from 
holding public office, the secularist media applauded.9 
Even as Erdoğan and Gül distanced themselves from 
the more aggressive Islamism of the Welfare Party, 
they still carried a profound sense of vulnerability  
and victimhood.
When the AK Party came to power in 2002, it bore  
the scars of those experiences. Erdoğan, now leader of 
the AKP, was only allowed to assume the premiership 
after a constitutional amendment in 2003. Five years 
later, the AKP faced another serious challenge to its 
existence when the Constitutional Court came only 
one vote short of ruling that the party should be 
closed for violating the constitution’s commitment 
to secularism. 
From its inception, the AK Party presented a very 
different image to that of its more Islamic predecessor. 
It committed to a greater openness for religion in 
public life in the context of its program to make Turkey 
more fully democratic. It actively embraced the free 
market, rejected anti-Western rhetoric, and pledged to 
implement an IMF standby agreement that required 
difficult economic reforms. 
The AK Party’s decision to pursue European Union  
accession required additional reforms and won new 
support from the international community, originally 
wary of the party’s Islamic roots. The aftereffects  
of the currency devaluation in 2001 and the IMF’s 
backing helped attract foreign investment, and the 
Ownership Group Newspapers TV Other Business Interests
Doğan Group Hürriyet, Radikal, Posta CNNTürk, Kanal D Energy, retail, industry, tourism
Doğuş Group -- NTV, Star Finance, Automotive, Construction, Energy, Retail
Feza Media Group Zaman, Today’s Zaman Not available
Ethem Sancak Akşam SkyTurk 360 Pharmaceuticals
Star Media Group Star Kanal 24 Energy (50 percent owned by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan)
Kalyon Group Sabah, Takvim ATV Construction
Ciner Group Habertürk Show TV, Habertürk TV Energy, Mining, Services
Demirören Group Milliyet, Vatan -- Energy, Mining, Industry,  Construction, Tourism
İhlas Holding Türkiye TGRT Haber Construction, Industry, Tourism, Mining
Albayrak Group Yeni Şafak TVNET Construction, Industry, Logistics, Energy, Services
Koza İpek Holding Bugün Kanaltürk Mining
Table 1.  
Main ownership  
groups in Turkey’s  
media, January 2014
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7new macroeconomic stability created a windfall of 
lower interest rates and a decline in Turkey’s chron-
ically high rate of inflation. This allowed the AKP to 
direct resources to its constituents in neglected cities 
across the country and to provide opportunities for 
the new business class. The EU’s strict demands for 
institutional reform provided an additional mandate 
for decreasing the involvement of the military in 
public life and gave an opportunity to install new (and, 
in some cases, more professional) cadres in the civil 
service, police, and judiciary. 
In its fight against the old guard, the AK Party also 
created a wider space for ideas and discussion. Yet as 
the AKP strengthened its political position, it began to 
assert more control over the media sector, and the old 
red lines were replaced with new ones. An important 
step came in 2007 when the country’s second-largest 
media group, Sabah-ATV, was sold to Çalık Holding. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak 
was the company’s CEO, and Albayrak’s brother led 
the media unit.10 In an unusual move, two state banks 
stepped in with financing worth $750 million of the 
$1.1 billion purchase.11 Sabah’s editorial line rapidly 
shifted from center-left to ardently pro-government.12
That same year, the government took aim at the 
largest media owner in the country, Doğan Media 
Group, which had long been associated with the 
secularist elite and had backed the 1997 “post-mod-
ern coup.” Doğan had enraged PM Erdoğan when its 
flagship papers, Hürriyet and Milliyet, gave extensive 
front-page coverage of a German court case, accusing 
several prominent Turkish citizens with ties to the top 
of the AKP of embezzling tens of millions of dollars 
from a Turkish charity. 
Erdoğan responded by calling for a boycott of the 
entire media group.13 In February 2009, Doğan Media 
Group was hit with a $500 million tax fine, raised in 
September of the same year to $2.5 billion, four-fifths 
of the market capitalization of the entire company.14 
The fine eventually forced Doğan to reduce its 
commanding position in the Turkish press, including 
by selling Milliyet and Vatan to another holding 
company with strong ties to the government.
The AKP also took on the military in 2007. In April, the 
army issued a statement pledging to be an “absolute 
defender of secularism” in a veiled threat reminiscent 
of 1997.15  In June, police launched the raids that 
would lead to accusations against ten army generals 
and hundreds of other officers, as well as various 
journalists and professors, for seeking to undermine 
the government with a convoluted conspiracy—
known as Ergenekon, after a mythical place of origin 
of the Turkish people—of assassinations and false flag 
operations. The indictments and trials were marked  
by appalling breaches of due process and judicial 
procedure, years of pretrial detention, and simple 
logical incoherence. 
Nevertheless, Ergenekon ended in September 2013 
with the conviction of 275 defendants, including  
the former chief of the Armed Forces. With military 
tutelage finally broken and the political opposition  
still tainted by its association with the military, the AK 
Party became the dominant political force in Turkey. 
The AKP did not break the old media or military 
tutelage by itself. Until recently, one of its key allies 
was the Gülen movement, a tightly networked group 
following the teachings of Islamic preacher Fethullah 
Gülen. The movement wields enormous economic 
and social power with a network of hundreds of 
schools and colleges in Turkey and abroad, and 
extensive business interests inside and outside the 
country. Turkey’s highest-circulation daily Zaman and 
the influential English-language Today’s Zaman are 
owned by the Gülen-affiliated Feza Media Group. Koza 
İpek Holding, which owns Bugün daily and Kanaltürk 
TV station, is also affiliated with the movement. 
When Doğan Media Group was under attack, Gülenist 
outlets were vocal in defending Erdoğan and blaming 
the group’s owner Aydın Doğan for bringing the prime 
minister’s wrath upon himself.16 During the Ergenekon 
cases, prosecutors allied with Gülen were seen as 
driving the charges against the military through leaks 
and stories in the movement’s outlets and to sympa-
thetic journalists. 
The alliance between Gülen supporters and Erdoğan 
started to change as the government took a more 
confrontational stance towards Israel and pursued 
rapprochement with the Kurdish PKK, which the 
Gülen movement has opposed for decades.17A failed 
attempt to remove Turkey’s intelligence chief Hakan 
Fidan in February 2012 was widely attributed to Gülen 
supporters within the judiciary unhappy with the 
outreach to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.18 The split 
between Gülen supporters and Erdoğan has now 
burst into full public view with the December 17  
corruption scandal, which has been played out in 
leaks to sympathetic journalists and stories in the 
movement’s outlets.
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8The tools used to pressure and control media outlets 
and individual journalists existed before the AK Party 
came to power. But the party, with its extraordinary 
political dominance, has used them unapologetically 
and with increasing frequency and force. The wave of 
firings and resignations during the Gezi Park protests, 
as outrageous as they are, are unfortunately just one 
example of the AKP’s determination to suppress a free 
press and full public debate.
The Gezi Park protests started on May 27, 2013, with a 
small group of environmental activists determined to 
block government plans to replace a park in Istanbul’s 
Taksim Square with a complex of hotels, a shopping 
mall, and restaurants. As news of the occupation 
spread on social media, hundreds of people joined in, 
united by their frustration with the government’s lack 
of accountability. The tipping point came on May 29 
and 30, when police routed protesters with tear gas 
and water cannons. Images of the brutality circulated 
rapidly on social media. A Reuters photograph of a 
young woman being sprayed in the face with pepper 
gas by a policeman wearing a gas mask became the 
iconic image of the protest. Tens of thousands rushed 
to occupy all of Taksim Square. Over the next two 
weeks, protests spread to 80 of the country’s 81 
provinces, with more than 3.5 million people partici-
pating, according to the government’s own estimates. 
Many of Turkey’s media outlets were caught off guard 
by these events and slow to adapt their coverage, 
drawing popular ire. Most notoriously, on June 1, as 
mass protests filled Istanbul and CNN International 
showed round-the-clock coverage, the Doğan-owned 
CNNTürk was broadcasting a nature documentary 
about penguins. The penguin became an ironic 
symbol of media cowardice in the protests.  
Some papers and television stations, including 
CNNTürk, soon caught up with the news, while  
other pro-government stations like NTV continued  
to push the government’s conspiratorial talking points 
(protesters even gathered in front of NTV’s offices). 
But the initial failure to cover Gezi showed the 
reflexive compliance and conflict aversion of the 
conglomerate-dominated media. 
It is difficult to firmly establish the number of report-
ers, editors, and broadcasters fired in the wake of Gezi. 
On July 26, the Turkish Journalists’ Union said that  
59 journalists had been fired or forced out; the 
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has 
compiled a list of 77 journalists who were fired or 
forced out due to their coverage of the protests.  
Some media employees cite much higher numbers. 
NTV Tarih, a history magazine owned by NTV, was shut 
down entirely and its staff let go after the magazine’s 
editors prepared a special “Gezi edition.” The Gezi 
firings continued through the fall. In November, the 
public broadcaster TRT fired two employees who used 
social media to voice their support for the protests.19
The government and its backers insist that there is  
no proof that the coverage of Gezi was behind any of 
these firings. That argument is hard to accept, given 
the government’s track record of intimidation and 
pressure against the media. Even before Gezi, it had 
become commonplace for top officials, especially 
Erdoğan, to publicly attack journalists who displease 
them, and for those journalists to be fired soon after. 
In 2011, after NTV host Nuray Mert compared the 
government’s policies in eastern Turkey to a nationalist 
massacre 70 years before, the prime minister 
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9denounced her writing as “despicable.” She lost her 
show with the channel, and was later fired from 
Milliyet.20 In August 2012, as the government’s peace 
process with the PKK foundered, the prime minister 
warned the press in a televised debate that it must 
ignore the conflict, arguing that broadcasting 
information about Turkish solders’ deaths would 
provide propaganda support for terrorists. “I really 
expect the media to act as one hand, one heart,” he 
said. “On whose side will the media be?”21
In March 2013, Milliyet columnist Hasan Cemal, one 
of Turkey’s most respected journalists, defended his 
paper’s decision to publish leaked informationon PKK 
leader Abdullah Öcalan’s attitudes toward peace talks. 
In a speech two days later, the prime minister attacked 
Cemal, saying, “If this is journalism, then down with 
your journalism!”22Milliyet fired Cemal later that month. 
In December 2013, one of Sabah’s best-known 
columnists Nazlı Ilıcak was fired the day after she 
criticized the government over the corruption scandal 
on a television news show.23 In January this year, 
Murat Aksoy, a prominent writer for Yeni Şafak, was 
also dismissed after making similarly critical remarks 
on air.
Editors and journalists in the mainstream media  
say that they receive regular phone calls from the 
prime minister’s office to change stories, to downplay 
coverage, or to fire reporters or columnists. The 
accounts are consistent and come from both 
government critics and those who have supported 
the AK Party, although the government officials 
Freedom House met with all denied such calls take 
place. One journalist said that the phone calls were  
no longer necessary: “There isn’t a person who calls 
every five minutes, but there is an expectation  
that they will.”24 Some editors have developed a  
pre-Pavlovian response—firing those who fail to  
heed the party line even before they hear the bell. 
The government also uses the courts to go after 
offending journalists. Despite strong international 
criticism,25 defamation is still criminalized under 
Turkish law. There is no official tally of defamation 
lawsuits by the prime minister, but the number may 
be in the hundreds. In addition to journalists, Erdoğan 
has sued high school students,26 political cartoonists, 
and musicians.27 In February 2012, he sued the 
then-editor of Taraf daily, Ahmet Altan, for defamation 
after Altan wrote an editorial criticizing his refusal to 
apologize after 34 civilians were killed by a Turkish 
airstrike. Altan later stepped down under pressure 
from the ownership of Taraf after advertisers  
became reluctant to advertise. In July 2013, Altan  
was convicted of defamation and ordered to pay a 
EUR2,800 fine, on top of the 6,000 euros he was 
already required to pay in compensation to Erdoğan 
under a previous civil suit.28 In December 2013, 
Erdoğan accused Taraf journalist Mehmet Baransu  
of “treason” for a story describing a National Security 
Council plan to counter the influence of Gülen and  
his movement.29 Baransu and Taraf are under criminal 
investigation for the story.30 In 2008 and 2009, the 
National Security Organization (MİT) ordered wiretaps 
of several journalists at Taraf who broke major 
national security stories. It was later revealed that  
MİT used false names for the reporters to prevent the 
judges from knowing who was being wiretapped.31
Journalists say it has become increasingly hard  
to predict what will draw the prime minister’s ire.  
One editor in chief told Freedom House, “It could be 
environmental, economic. After all, everything related 
to life is related to politics.”32Journalist Can Dündar, 
who was fired from Milliyet in August 2013, said about 
his editors, “They told me at [Milliyet], I don’t want 
news that will irritate the prime minister, but I don’t 
know what news will irritate him. Anything can be 
irritating, and once we irritate them they fire us.”33
The prime minister is not alone in practicing intimida-
tion. During the Gezi protests, the AKP mayor of 
Ankara, Melih Gökçek, started a Twitter campaign 
against BBC reporter Selin Girit with the hashtag 
“#Don’t be a spy in the name of England Selin Girit.” 
The BBC issued a statement calling the campaign 
“unacceptable.”34 In October, the AKP mayor of 
Eskişehir sent an email to a reporter from Radikal 
saying it was “vile and inglorious” to continue to report 
on the case of a protester who was beaten to death  
by police.35
One journalist described how her colleagues relished 
interviewing the opposition because it gave them a 
chance to act like “real journalists” by asking difficult 
questions and pressing for answers. Such aggressive 
reporting, she said, is not allowed with the AK Party. 
That too ensures that the coverage of the opposition 
is far more critical than that of the government. 
Freedom House
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How a History Magazine Fell Victim  
to Self-Censorship 
 
Andrew Finkel
The abrupt closure of NTV Tarih, a popular history 
magazine with a healthy circulation, may not be 
the most egregious example of self-censorship  
in Turkey. But it is an unhappy illustration of a 
mainstream media nervous of its own shadow.  
“There was an element of happenstance. The 
magazine might have survived had it gone to 
press a few days earlier,” explains Neyyire Özkan, 
who was herself forced to step down as head of 
the Doğuş Magazine Group. She describes the 
magazine as a “star” in a list of publications that 
consisted of mainly Turkish-language franchises 
for titles such as Vogue, National Geographic, 
and GQ. NTV Tarih was among the best-selling 
monthly magazines in Turkey, but created entirely 
in-house.
“We weren’t stuffy, and we weren’t ideological.  
We took on controversies and tried to make 
people understand them from different historical 
perspectives,” says its editor, Gürsel Göncü. In 
short, it tried to turn “official” history into just 
history. When Prime Minister Erdoğan issued  
a guarded apology in November 2011 for the 
massacre of Alevis Kurds in the late 1930s in  
the eastern province of Dersim, the magazine 
followed with a cover story about this no-longer 
taboo episode of Turkey’s early Republican past. 
Monthly sales of around 35,000 nearly doubled.
Göncü was expecting an even more enthusiastic 
reception for the July 2013 issue, which  
was inspired by the previous month’s head-
line-grabbing occupation of Istanbul’s Gezi Park. 
It set out to chart the history of popular 
protest in Istanbul from the 404 AD Nika riots  
of Byzantium, through Ottoman and Republican 
times. And it tried to see Gezi in the context of 
world events. The editors had also reconstructed 
a painstaking, hour-by-hour, tweet-by-tweet 
timeline of the Gezi events. This was billed on  
the front cover as #yaşarkenyazilantarih  
(#historywrittenasitislived). Success for the issue 
seemed all but guaranteed by an ingenious front 
cover. Artist Taha Alkan had recreated the  
iconic photo of the Gezi protest—a young 
woman university lecturer in a red dress being 
sprayed in the face with pepper gas by a masked 
policeman—in the style of an Ottoman  
miniature painting. 
NTV Tarih was not the only Doğuş publication to 
use the Gezi theme. Even that month’s issue of 
Turkish Vogue featured Gezi chic. However, by the 
time the presses were ready to turn, the entire 
media group had become embroiled in far greater 
controversy. NTV television station, the group’s 
flagship 24-hour channel, had come under bitter 
attack by its own viewers for its initial reluctance 
to cover the Gezi events, and then for its 
eagerness to comply with the government’s spin 
that the protests were part of a greater conspiracy. 
As a result, crowds of demonstrators gathered  
Cover of the censored edition of NTV Tarih.  
Reproduced by permission of the publisher.
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in front of the media giant’s imposing Istanbul 
headquarters. On the other side of the city, near 
Gezi Park itself, protesters set upon and de-
stroyed an NTV remote-broadcasting truck. 
These protests appear to have prompted a great 
deal of soul-searching within the NTV newsroom. 
Cem Aydın, the media group’s chief executive 
officer, assembled the entire staff to confess that 
the organization had lost its way. Well before Gezi, 
the news channel had begun axing its hallmark 
discussion programs and shedding many 
well-known presenters and commentators who 
had given the station its critical edge. It had 
adopted an all too familiar, anodyne editorial 
policy to avoid giving the government offense. 
“We only covered news that wasn’t news,” one 
cameraman said, according to accounts by those 
who attended the meeting. Aydın pledged to 
recover the public’s trust, no matter how long it 
took. Tayfun Ertan, NTV television’s first editor in 
chief, reflects on the irony of it all. The station 
was founded in 1996 by Cavit Çağlar, a business-
man-politician who had been a supporter of 
then-President Süleyman Demirel and who was 
later convicted of bank fraud. “We only signed on 
to the project when he gave his word he would 
never interfere with news content. And he kept 
that promise, even during politically turbulent 
times,” Ertan says. 
Ertan, still working for Doğuş Group (he was 
subsequently dismissed), listened to Aydın’s 
apology, and afterwards the two men spoke.  
“We have to get ourselves organized like we were 
at the beginning,” Aydın told him. Instead of 
trying to strike a balance that was not possible, 
he said that NTV should go back to its first 
principles of doing the news.
He never got the chance. A few days later, Aydın 
stepped down from his post. All this was before 
NTV Tarih tried to go to press.
Erman Yerdelen, chairman of the board of Doğuş 
Media Group, makes it clear that Aydın had no 
authority to convene that meeting of employees, 
nor to change the direction of NTV’s editorial 
policy. He describes that policy as “center of  
the road.” He rejects suggestions that NTV news 
channel had turned into an uncritical vehicle for 
the ruling party’s point of view but says nor is it 
the station’s mission to be a soapbox for the 
government’s critics. 
If the television conveyed the message of the 
government, this was because it was popularly 
elected by 50 percent of the population and they 
wanted to know what the government had to say. 
The views of the opposition were also being 
reported. “To my way of thinking, Turkey has full 
freedom of the press. Anyone can start up a 
newspaper tomorrow,” Yerdelen says. 
And Yerdelen is unapologetic about his  
decision not just to spike the Gezi issue of  
NTV Tarih but to shut down the magazine,  
lock, stock, and barrel. The reasons he gives  
are twofold: Despite its relatively high sales 
(twice as many copies as Turkish Vogue), it wasn’t 
bringing in advertising revenue. Printing extra 
copies would not have made it profitable. And he 
accused its editor of turning a history magazine 
into a political platform, and of trying to rush  
the magazine into press without approval.  
“It overstepped the boundaries,” he says.
Göncü takes issue with this interpretation  
of events. He says it is impossible that a 
strong-selling magazine produced by an editorial 
staff of five, that did not pay a foreign license, 
could have been taking a loss. And he says it was 
inconceivable to think the magazine could leave 
the printers without the publisher’s consent. 
At the same time, he remains philosophical  
about his brainchild’s plight. The pages of the 
magazine found their way onto the Internet,  
and from there to the publishing house Metis, 
who reprinted the Gezi issue as a book. The 
proceeds go to the families of those who died 
 in the Gezi protests. “What happened to the 
magazine cannot be erased. It became part  
of the history it tried to write.”
Freedom House
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Money is the government’s most potent tool for 
controlling the media. The breakup of Turkey’s two 
dominant media groups was complete by 2011, when 
the Sabah-ATV group had been sold to Çalık Holding, 
led by Erdoğan’s son-in-law, and Doğan sold the news-
papers Milliyet and Vatan to settle its bill from the tax 
case. The sale of Milliyet, perhaps the most respected 
brand in Turkish journalism, dramatically diminished 
the influence of the Doğan Media Group. The huge 
tax fine also served as a clear warning to other media 
owners of the cost of challenging the government.
Every holding company with interests in the  
media sector benefits from government contracts. 
The following are only select examples:
•   Doğuş Holding (NTV, StarTV) won a $702  
million bid in May 2013 to operate Istanbul’s 
Galataport in Karaköy.36
•   In November, İhlas Holding (Türkiye,  
İhlas News Agency, TGRT TV) signed a  
$1.86 billion deal to redevelop Istanbul’s  
Gaziosmanpaşa neighborhood.37
•   The Demirören Group, whose Milangaz subsidiary 
is one of the country’s liquefied petroleum gas 
giants and which built the controversial Demirören 
shopping center on Istanbul’s Istiklal Avenue, 
bought Milliyet and Vatan from Doğan in 2011. 
According to Erdoğan himself, the company’s owner, 
Erdoğan Demirören, asked the prime minister for 
his recommendation for editor in chief of Milliyet 
after buying the paper.38
The role of public tenders and privatization in main-
taining government influence over media cannot  
be overstated. The prime minister’s office controls 
billions of dollars in projects per year as the chair  
of the Privatization High Council (OİB). The PM has  
final say over privatization approvals, creating a clear 
incentive for diversified holding companies to avoid  
all conflict with his office. An even larger amount of 
money flows through the public procurement process. 
In 2012, the government issued $46.2 billion worth  
of contracts, with key holding companies with media 
outlets eagerly bidding. Billions more are distributed 
through the Housing Development Administration 
(TOKİ), also run by the prime minister’s office. Defense 
industry procurement, also overseen by the PM 
through the Defense Industry Executive Committee,  
is another major source of patronage and pressure.
Over time, these procurement practices have become 
even less transparent. In the last two years, amend-
ments to procurement law placed tenders in multiple 
sectors (including defense, security, intelligence, 
technology, and railways) outside the purview of the 
watchdog Public Procurement Authority (KİK) that is 
responsible for issuing monitoring reports on public 
tenders.39 A change buried in the fourth judicial reform 
package in 2012 also reduced criminal charges for bid 
rigging in public tenders.40
The Court of Accounts, which is charged with monitor-
ing and reporting to parliament on government 
spending, was defanged by June 2012 legislation that 
limited the court’s autonomy to pursue audits.41 The 
Constitutional Court overturned the legislation in 
December 2012, yet the Court of Accounts has been 
Media Ownership  
and Dependency
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unable to audit public institutions for the last two 
years and will not be able to do so for at least three 
more because of an amendment that exempted state 
institutions from providing account details.42
The Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund (TMSF),  
the body attached to the prime minister’s office that 
recovers debt owed to banks and failed financial 
institutions, provides another means for to assert 
control over the media. TMSF has on several occa-
sions seized control of media organizations whose 
parent companies have been in trouble. The reliable 
result is resale to companies sympathetic to the  
AK Party. This was the mechanism by which the 
Sabah-ATV group was sold to Çalık Holding in 2007, 
and in 2013 Çukurova’s media properties went to 
Ethem Sancak, a wealthy businessmen and a passion-
ate supporter of the PM.43 Even before Sancak’s 
purchase of Akşam, TMSF had appointed a former AKP 
deputy to be the editor in chief of the newspaper.44
A remark heard frequently during Freedom House’s 
investigations is that many owners of powerful 
holding companies regard media properties as a 
burden rather than a privilege—a levy that must be 
paid to ensure continued access to government 
contracts. An increasingly common phenomenon  
is a game of “pass the can,” where holding companies 
bear the cost of running a pro-government media 
group for a time and then try to transfer ownership  
to another beneficiary of government favor as quickly 
as circumstances allow.
The result is an atmosphere of complicity, censorship, 
and outright stenography on the part of a large 
segment of the media. It is no longer unusual for 
multiple newspapers to run the same headline when 
the political stakes are particularly high. In November, 
during a very public rift between Deputy Prime 
Minister Bülent Arınç and Prime Minister Erdoğan 
over Erdoğan’s vow to use the police to investigate 
co-ed student housing, six newspapers ran near-iden-
tical headlines quoting the prime minister playing 
down the feud: “We will solve it amongst ourselves” is 
what readers saw when they picked up their papers.
The same thing happened in early June when seven 
papers ran headlines with an identical quote from  
the prime minister on his return from North Africa 
during the Gezi protests: “I would give my life for the  
demands of democracy,” he declared, suggesting that 
like his hero Adnan Menderes, the prime minister 
hanged by the military in 1960, he was willing to 
martyr himself for the cause of democracy.45
Six pro-government 
newspapers on  
November 9, 2013,  
feature headlines  
saying “We will solve  
it amongst ourselves.”
Freedom House
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The government and its supporters acknowledge that 
media owners are eager to please the prime minister, 
and even that these owners may be afraid of the 
consequences of displeasing him. But they refuse to 
take responsibility for the atmosphere of intimidation 
described consistently by reporters, editors, and even 
some owners, speaking privately. Without apparent 
irony, ministers insist that if owners and editors are 
“real journalists,” they should be able to withstand the 
pressure against them.46 As the editor in chief of one  
of the country’s leading papers told Freedom House, 
“You are ‘free’ to write anything, if you are willing to pay 
the price. This is the atmosphere created by the prime 
minister’s office.”47
Imprisonment and Detention
The most chilling example of government abuse is  
the detention and imprisonment of a large number of 
journalists, mainly but not all Kurdish. As of December 
1, 2013, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 
found that 40 journalists were imprisoned as a result 
of their work. While down from the 49 that the 
organization documented in 2012, the number still 
made Turkey the top jailer of journalists in the world, 
ahead of China and Iran.48 Local monitoring organiza-
tion Bianet lists 59 imprisoned journalists and 23 
media employees.49
As other reports have documented, the majority  
of the journalists in prison or in pretrial detention  
are Kurds working for outlets associated with the 
Kurdish movement.50 According to some analysts, 
 the government is keeping the journalists and 
activists to be used as bargaining chips with the  
PKK in negotiations. 
Approximately one-quarter of the imprisoned  
journalists (as counted by CPJ) work for media outlets 
associated with banned leftist movements, while a 
smaller number were swept up in the Ergenekon trials. 
Two of the reporters that covered the trial, Ahmet Şık 
and Nedim Şener, were held in pretrial detention for 
over a year on charges of being part of Ergenekon,  
the organization they were supposed to be covering. 
Şener, who had written a book accusing police of 
organizing the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant 
Dink, and Şık, who had written a book about Gülen 
supporters in the police, are still facing charges of 
supporting an armed terrorist organization in the 
OdaTV case, one of the spinoffs from the original 
Ergenekon trial.
The high number of imprisoned and detained journal-
ists in Turkey is a direct consequence of overly broad 
and aggressively applied antiterrorism laws, combined 
with a judicial system that too often sees its role as 
protecting the state, rather than the individual.51 
Flagrant abuses of due process and fair trial are 
common. Even after several rounds of reform, the 
antiterrorism laws make it possible to prosecute 
journalists for producing “propaganda” for terrorist 
organizations or “aiding” a criminal organization with  
a low burden of proof. The definitions of “terrorism,” 
“terrorist organization,” and “propaganda” continue  
to be so open-ended that interviews with PKK leaders 
or descriptions of PKK activities, as well as other 
“armed” or “terrorist” organizations, could easily be 
used for prosecution of journalists. According to 
Human Rights Watch, the Ministry of Justice’s own 
figures show that 8,995 people were imprisoned as  
of last year on terrorism charges.52 These fundamental 
ambiguities in the law and the history of their use 
should be remembered when Erdoğan describes the 
Gülen movement as an “organization” that has 
committed “treachery.”53
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The Gezi events and the December corruption scandal 
have reinforced the AK Party leadership’s historic 
sense of victimhood and its fear of another coup.  
With the military marginalized, its suspicions  
are primarily focused on the many members of the 
judiciary and the police that are affiliated with their 
former allies in the Gülen movement. At the same 
time, they are stepping up attacks on freedom of 
expression. Proposed amendments to Law 5651 
regulating the Internet, under discussion in parlia-
ment at the time of writing, would allow government 
officials to order websites blocked for “violations of 
privacy” without a court order. This would be a flagrant 
rejection of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which ruled on this issue in a case against Turkey in 
December 2012.54 Unless the prime minister and his 
advisers change course, tensions will grow, with 
additional revelations of corruption likely and  
the country preparing for three critical elections  
(for local office in March 2014, president in August 
2014, and parliament in June 2015). One of the  
most pernicious effects of the widespread firings of 
reporters and editors from the “mainstream” media  
is that there are fewer moderate voices to be heard.  
The result is an increasingly shrill and divisive media—
and public debate—split into “Erdoğanist” loyalists  
and polemical critics.55
In the medium term, there are reasons for hope, 
especially if the United States and other members  
of the international community do more to support 
and defend Turkey’s democracy. The clash between 
the powerful Gülen movement and the AK Party has 
opened more space for critical reporting as well as 
criticism of the government, despite the government’s 
best efforts to silence debate. The rise of social media 
provides a new platform for journalists to challenge 
the government’s claims and voice their opinions. 
After her firing from Sabah in December, Nazlı Ilıcak 
cited her Twitter reach, saying, “I have 500,000 
followers. That’s more than Sabah’s circulation.”56  
Most important, there is a new generation of media 
outlets developing, with a strong commitment to 
more balanced reporting. 
Gezi also showed there is a strong demand in Turkey 
for professional news and journalists willing to stand 
up to government pressure. The news site T24 has 
become a refuge for fired journalists and has seen its 
readership quintuple from 25,000 to 125,000 this year. 
Upstart sites like Vagus. TV, founded by journalist 
Serdar Akinan, incorporate user-generated video and 
commentary. The dramatic changes in Turkey’s politics, 
economy, and media present an opportunity for 
entrepreneurs, international foundations, and develop-
ment agencies to invest in Turkey’s media market.
Turkey’s business community has an important role to 
play. The current crisis notwithstanding, the long-term 
promise of increasing European investment remains a 
guiding incentive for business leaders to press the 
government to support legal reforms, including more 
transparent procurement practices. The Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently 
being negotiated between the United States and 
Europe, provides an opportunity for a parallel invest-
ment pact between Turkey and the United States. If 
approached with rigorous standards that condition 
agreement on greater accountability and transparen-
cy in government, these processes could help 
promote institutional development and a more 
democratic political system.
Prognosis
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Turkey
The AKP-led government must recognize that its 
efforts to control a free debate are further alienating 
Turkey’s citizens and could potentially threaten the 
country’s stability. It could also put at risk Turkey’s 
integration with Europe and its strong alliance with 
the United States.
The problems of how to construct and defend a 
democratic state are fundamentally ones the Turkish 
people must resolve. In Freedom House’s meetings 
with high-ranking officials in November 2013, the 
government came prepared to discuss legal reforms 
and the long list of imprisoned journalists. We saw this 
as a sign that international criticism was having at 
least some impact. The harsh official response to the 
unfolding corruption scandal, however, casts serious 
doubt on whether a government that sees itself 
permanently locked in a mortal struggle with its 
persecutors can engage in a process of reform. 
Turkey’s citizens and the world are watching. To 
strengthen Turkey’s democracy, this government,  
and any future government, must do the following: 
•  Cease all efforts to bully and intimidate the press. 
High-ranking officials must drop their personal 
vendettas, and the government must fully imple-
ment European Court of Human Rights rulings that 
have clearly stated that Turkish officials who bring 
defamation suits to silence criticism are violating 
freedom of expression. The court has also ruled 
that issuing injunctions against publications 
without strict judicial scrutiny violates freedom  
of expression.57
•  Abolish the Anti-Terror Law (TMK), which makes 
investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of 
people accused of crimes involving terrorism fall 
under a different, dangerously vague, and draconian 
legal regime. This law has been used repeatedly to 
prosecute journalists for doing their job.
•  Further revise Article 220 of the criminal code 
(TCK) concerning “Criminal Organizations.”  
The article’s overly broad language, including 
“committing a crime in the name of” or “aiding”  
a criminal organization, gives the courts far too 
much discretion.
•  Abolish Article 301 of the criminal code criminaliz-
ing “insulting the Turkish nation.”
•  Decriminalize defamation by abolishing Article 125 
of the criminal code.
The government must also address the widespread 
perception of corruption in the public procurement 
and privatization processes. The government cannot 
dictate that media owners will place journalistic 
mission and ethics above the profit motive. But with 
more transparency and fewer conflicts of interest, 
the capacity for Turkish governments to control media 
content will diminish. To improve the transparency of 
public procurement, the Turkish government should 
do the following:
•  Commence accession to the World Trade  
Organization Government Procurement Agreement 
(WTO GPA) in order to improve transparency and 
accountability in the bidding process. The GPA will 
Recommendations
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be complementary to both EU accession and a TTIP 
parallel pact with the United States.
•  Review, in coordination with the EU, the institution-
al arrangements that place the Housing Authority 
(TOKİ) and the Privatization High Council (OİB) in 
the prime minister’s office and that make the prime 
minister the chair of the Defense Industry Execu-
tive Committee. Authority for procurement should 
be aligned with EU best practices in order to 
prepare for accession. 
European Union
The European Union has encouraged important 
reforms in Turkey. But the EU’s leverage diminished as 
some member states, consumed with their own crises 
and wary of admitting a Muslim-majority nation, 
obstructed further progress and soured many in 
Turkey on the accession process. With the European 
financial crisis stabilized, a new president in France, 
and a relatively pro-Turkey Social Democratic Party 
now in the ruling coalition in Germany, there have 
been signs of progress. Accession still remains a 
distant goal, but the process of harmonization is the 
best course for Turkey’s economic and political future. 
The “positive agenda” begun in May 2012, the opening 
this year of a new chapter of the acquis, and the 
recent agreement to pursue visa liberalization are all 
positive steps. The EU must continue to press for 
reforms in Turkey, while offering economic incentives 
to help keep those reforms on course. It must also 
make clear that backsliding into repression will 
damage the relationship and cause serious harm 
to Turkey’s economy.  Specifically, the EU must do  
the following: 
•  Maintain its emphasis on media freedom as a key 
barometer of Turkish democracy, pressing Turkey 
to follow unambiguous European Court of Human 
Rights rulings on defamation law, use of injunctions, 
and judicial scrutiny for any restrictions on access 
to information.
•  Complete the visa liberalization protocol that 
would allow Turkish citizens to travel visa-free to 
the EU as an incentive for further Turkish engage-
ment with the EU and reforms. 
•  Place additional emphasis on transparency in 
public procurement practices as part of the 
accession process, including by emphasizing 
Turkish accession to the World Trade Organization 
Government Procurement Agreement.
•  Release, without further delay, the official criteria 
for opening chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental 
rights) and 24 (justice, freedom, and security) of 
the accession acquis.
•  Expand public diplomacy efforts across Turkey, 
including outside of Istanbul and Ankara, promot-
ing both democratic values and the economic and 
political benefits of Turkish integration into the EU. 
•  Provide greater resources in support of media 
independence and civil society as part of its 
pre-accession funding programs.
United States
For years, the Obama and Bush administrations 
oversold Turkey’s potential to be a model for the 
reconciliation of Islam and democracy. This govern-
ment’s increasing authoritarianism cannot be ignored 
or denied any longer. The United States urgently needs 
a policy that fits the reality of current events in Turkey. 
President Obama cultivated a close relationship with 
Prime Minister Erdoğan—in October 2011, the Los 
Angeles Times said he had spoken more with Erdoğan 
than any world leader other than British Prime 
Minister David Cameron58—, but Erdoğan has received 
nearly all of the benefit. Obama’s decision to visit 
Turkey on his first overseas trip in 2009—in the midst 
of the government’s fierce attacks on the Doğan 
Media Group—was viewed as a particular triumph  
for Erdoğan, and Obama’s decision to compliment 
Turkey’s performance on media freedom in his speech 
to parliament was a profound error. It was inevitably 
seen by the Turkish government as new license to 
harass and intimidate the press. Several pro-Western 
journalists interviewed for this report expressed anger 
and bitterness over that speech and at the administra-
tion’s uncritical support for Erdoğan until very recently.
The White House’s attitude toward Turkey has soured 
in recent months, primarily because of Erdoğan’s 
refusal to follow through on rapprochement with 
Israel as well as differences over Turkey’s support for 
extremist groups in Syria. But the Obama administra-
tion is still not speaking out at a high enough level 
against Turkey’s suppression of the media and dissent. 
Statements of concern from the State Department 
spokesperson are not enough. Prime Minister 
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Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül both need  
to hear unequivocally from President Obama that 
steps to roll back democratic reforms are damaging 
relations and undermining the ability to work towards 
shared goals. In addition to speaking out, the United 
States should support Turkey’s democracy with the 
following steps:  
•  Establish a new policy framework that integrates 
human rights and democracy as enduring pillars of 
the bilateral relationship on par with the security 
and economic dimensions. This should be shared 
from the highest levels of the U.S. government  
with Turkish counterparts, and a regular timetable 
should be established for assessing progress, such 
as biannual policy dialogues. A senior official on 
each side should be designated as point person for 
these dialogues, and there should be a component 
that facilitates input and transparency with the 
media and civil society.
•  The appropriate U.S. government bodies (i.e., State 
Department, Department of Defense, National 
Security Council) must work more collaboratively  
in constructing a longer-term, holistic Turkey policy 
that acknowledges that the viability of Turkey’s 
democracy and its adherence to human rights 
commitments, starting with freedom of expres-
sion, affect United States foreign policy objectives 
in Europe and the Middle East.
Like the EU, the United States can use economic 
negotiations to support greater government account-
ability and transparency. The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S. and 
the EU offers an opportunity to increase free trade 
with Turkey as well. Turkey’s customs union with the 
EU means that Turkey has a high stake in the outcome 
of the TTIP, but cannot participate in negotiations. 
Turkish business leaders and the government are 
rightly concerned that they not be ignored in the 
process. The U.S. government should:
•  Begin parallel negotiations with Turkey on a 
free-trade pact to accompany the U.S.-EU TTIP, and 
make transparency and accountability in the public 
procurement process and all business and financial 
dealings a central component of these negotiations.
Turkey is an important player in some of the U.S.’s 
most important strategic arenas and interests, 
including resolution of the war in Syria, maintenance 
of the NATO alliance, and preservation of the  
territorial integrity of Iraq. Washington and Brussels 
both must recognize that Turkey’s future as a stable 
democracy, and a reliable ally, is increasingly in doubt. 
The current government’s abuses pose a serious 
threat to Turkey’s democracy. They must not  
go unchallenged.
SPECIAL REPORT Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey
19
Endnotes
1  “Turkey’s Entertainment and Media Sector to Reach  
$11.6 Billion,” Hürriyet Daily News, 10 July 2013.
2   “Newspaper Circulation,” Sustainable Governance  
Indicators 2011, Bertelsmann Stiftung.
3  Turkish Media at a Glance, Republic of Turkey Office  
of the Prime Minister, 2013.
4 Ibid.
5   This report uses as its primary lens changes in the daily 
newspaper sector because newspapers remain more focused 
than television on journalism, because newspapers are still the 
source of prestige and affiliation for Turkish journalists, most  
of whom are known by the newspapers where they work as 
columnists, and because the changes in ownership structures 
and political allegiances are most visible through the  
newspaper industry.
6   Circulation numbers, which fluctuate week by week,  
are rounded from the week of 6–12 January 2014 on 
Medyatava.com.
7   Interview with government official, November 2013.
 
8   The 1997 events are often called the “post-modern coup,” 
because of the military’s ability to engineer the fall of the 
government without an explicit threat. For examples of  
Hürriyet’s breathless coverage, see the cover pages archived  
at “Unforgettable Headlines” at  
http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/_files/UNUTULAN_
MANSETLER/1993-1997.pdfhttp://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/_
files/UNUTULAN_MANSETLER/1997-1999.pdf. 
9  See “Tayyip’in bitişi” (The End of Tayyip), Hürriyet,  
24 September 1998. 
10   Albayrak left Çalık in November 2013, one month before 
Sabah-ATV was sold to Kalyon Group, a construction firm 
involved in the redevelopment of Taksim Square in Istanbul.
11   M.K. Kaya and Svante Cornell, “Politics, Media, and Power  
in Turkey,” Turkey Analyst, Central Asia Caucasus Institute,  
4 June 2008.
12   Aslı Aydintaşbaş, “Turkey’s War on the Press,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 18 September 2009. Sabah was sold to the Kalyon Group 
in December 2013. “Turkish Media Group Sabah-ATV Sold to 
Kalyon Group,” 20 December 2013.
 
13   “Erdoğan draws ire with boycott call,” Today’s Zaman, 
22 September 2008.
14   “Turkey gov’t hits media group Doğan with tax fine,” Reuters, 
8 September 2009.
15   “Excerpts of Turkish Army Statement,” BBC, 28 April 2007.
16   Bülent Keneş “Doğan-Erdoğan row dates back to the 1970s,” 
Today’s Zaman, 15 September 2008.
17   Günter Seufert, Is the Fethullah Gülen Movement Overstretching 
Itself? A Turkish Religious Community as a National and 
International Player, German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, January 2014.
18   Halil M. Karaveli, “The Coalition Crumbles: Erdoğan,  
the Gülenists, and Turkish Democracy,” Turkey Analyst,  
Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 20 February 2012.
19   “Public Broadcaster Sacks Two Employees for Gezi Tweets,” 
Hürriyet Daily News,14 November 2013.
20  “Turkish PM Targets Economist Magazine, Journalist Nuray Mert,” 
Hürriyet Daily News, 3 June 2011.
21  “Erdoğan Tells Media Not to Cover Kurdish Conflict,” Committee 
to Protect Journalists, 12 September 2012.
22   “IPI Expresses Concern at Erdoğan Criticism of Peace 
Negotiations News Report,” International Press Institute,  
5 March 2013.
23   “Sabah Newspaper Lays off Journalist Nazlı Ilıcak,” Bianet,  
19 December 2013.
24 Interview with journalists, November 2013.
25  Including rulings by the European Court of Human Rights.  
See Tuşalp v. Turkey, 2012. 
26   “PM Sues High School Students for Defamation,” Bianet,  
12 February 2013.
27   “Call the PrimeMinister a Turkey, Get Sued,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 7 June 2011. 
28   “Turkey Focus 2013: Ahmet Altan,” English PEN, 13 August 2013.
29   “Turkish PM Erdoğan Accuses Taraf Reporter of ‘Treason’  
Over Leak Story,” Hürriyet Daily News, 7 December 2013.
30   “Turkish Daily Taraf’s Reporter Faces Spying Probe for Leak Story,” 
Hürriyet Daily News, 6 December 2013.
31  “HSYK Launches Probe into MİT Wiretapping Columnists,”  
Today’s Zaman, 24 November 2013.
32 Interview with newspaper editor, November 2013.
33   “Can Dündar: 12 Eylül sansürünü özledim,” T24, 8 October 2013.
34  “Statement Regarding BBC Reporters in Turkey,” BBC,  
24 June 2013.
35   “Eskişehir Governor Threatens Journalist over Reports on  
Gezi Protester’s Murder,” Hürriyet Daily News, 2 October 2013. 
36   “Doğuş Wins Galataport Tender with $702 Million Bid,” 
Hürriyet Daily News, 16 May 2013.
37   “İhlas, Gaziosmanpaşa’yı 1 milyar 860 milyon dolara 
dönüştürecek!” Radikal, 13 November 2013.
38  Yeni bir şova göz yummayız,” Hürriyet,  
22 March 2013.
39   Abdullah Bozkurt, “Responsible Public Procurement, Please,” 
Today’s Zaman, 2 September 2013.
40   Abdullah Bozkurt, “Get out of Jail Free Card for Bid-Rigging  
in Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, 3 May 2013,.
41   Diğdem Soyaltın, “Turkish Court of Accounts in Crisis: An Urgent 
Problem, Yet not a Main Concern?” Research Turkey,  
19 December 2013.
42   “Turkish Court of Accounts Won’t Audit Public Spending  
for Another Three Years: Report,” Hürriyet Daily News,  
13 December 2013. 
43   “Akşam ve SkyTurk 360, Ethem Sancak’ın oldu,” T24,  
21 November 2013 
44   “Ankara Appoints Former AKP Deputy as Editor-in-Chief of 
Seized Newspaper,” Hürriyet Daily News, 24 June 2013. 
45   “7 Gazete, 1 Genel Yayın Yönetmeni,” Bianet, 7 June 2013.
46  Interviews with government officials, November 2013. 
Freedom House
www.freedomhouse.org
20
47  Interview with newspaper editor, November 2013.
48   “2013 Prison Census,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 
1 December 2013.
49  “Basın Özgürlüğü Tepetaklak!,” Bianet, 14 January 2013.
50   The KCK is a civilian body connected with the leadership of the 
PKK. Under the aegis of fighting terrorism, the government has 
arrested thousands of people allegedly connected via the KCK 
to the PKK, including journalists, professors, publishers, and 
members of parliament. Of the 40 journalists imprisoned in CPJ’s 
2013 tally, 24 were associated with Kurdish activism. 
51   For detailed discussion of the laws as they currently stand  
after the effect of recent reforms, see TESEV, Judicial Reform 
Packages: Evaluating their Effects on Rights and Freedoms, 
November 2013.
52  “Turkey,” World Report 2013, Human Rights Watch.
53   “Erdoğan declares war on Gülen’s ‘empire of fear’,”  
AFP, 15 January 2014.
54  Yıldırım v. Turkey, 2012.
55   William Armstrong, “Rift with Gülen Movement Exposes  
Rise of ‘Erdoğanist’ Media,” Turkish Press Review Blog,  
16 December 2013. 
56   “In Scandal, Turkey’s Leaders May Be Losing Their Tight Grip  
on News Media,” The New York Times, 11 January 2014. 
57   See, among others, ECtHR rulings Tuşalp v. Turkey, 2012, Yıldırım 
v. Turkey 2012, and Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others v. Turkey, 2013.
58   Paul Richter, “Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan Poses Challenge 
for Obama,” Los Angeles Times, 10 October 2011.
SPECIAL REPORT Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey
D
es
ig
n:
 D
es
ig
nl
ou
ng
e,
 In
c.
, N
ew
 Y
or
k
www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom House is a nonprofit, nonpartisan 
organization that supports democratic  
change, monitors freedom, and advocates  
for democracy and human rights.
1301 Connecticut Ave. NW., Floor 6
Washington D.C. 20036
120 Wall Street, 26th floor
New York, NY 10005
www.freedomhouse.org
202.296.5101
info@freedomhouse.org
